The monetary transmission mechanism in Italy: the credit channel and a missing ring by Tamborini, Roberto & Fiorentini, Riccardo
The monetary transmission mechanism in Italy:
The credit channel and a missing ring*
Riccardo Fiorentini
University of Pavia, Institute of Statistics,
Via Strada Nuova 65, 27100 Padova, Italy,
E-mail: FIORE@UNIPV.IT
Roberto Tamborini
University of Trento, Department of Economics,
Via Inama 5, 38100 Trento, Italy,
Tel. 0461-882228, Fax. 0461-882222
E-mail: RTAMBORI@RISC1.GELSO.UNITN.IT
forthcoming
Giornale degli Economisti
                                        
* Financial support was given by the research project "Policy problems and
policy options under alternative monetary regimes" financed by MURST
(Ministery of University and Scientific Research, Italy) and the University of
Trento, Italy.  We wish to thank the participants in the research group for
their helpful comments, and in particular Axel Leijonhufvud and Marcello
Messori. We also acknowledge useful suggestions by the editor and an
anonymous referee. The authors bear full responsibility for this paper.
2
3Abstract
Research on how money affects economic activity has revived interest in
the so-called "credit view". In this paper we focus on  current developments
in the credit view in order to assess the results of the past decade's
research and its legacy for macroeconomics and monetary policy. We
expound the main models of the "credit channels" of monetary
transmission, drawing a distinction between models of aggregate demand,
which are predominant, and models of aggregate supply, which are less
developed despite theory suggests a potential connection between credit
conditions and firms' production activity. Each approach is accompanied
by a survey of the main empirical results with particular reference to Italy,
where bank-firm relations are traditionally regarded as particularly
important.
J.E.L.: E2, E5
THE MONETARY TRANSMISSION MECHANISM IN ITALY: THE
CREDIT CHANNEL AND A MISSING RING
1. Introduction
Research on how money affects economic activity has revived
interest in the so-called "credit view". The latter, in fact, is a rather
heterogenous collection of views  on the monetary transmission
mechanism, which date far back in history, but share the idea that
the key ring that links monetary policy to economic activity is its
power to induce changes in banks' assets (i.e. total credit to the
economy), rather than in banks' liabilities (i.e. money balances in
the economy) as assumed by the traditional “money view” that has
predominated in macroeconomics during the past half-century. In
this paper we focus on  current developments in the credit view in
order to  assess the results of the last decade's research and its
legacy for macroeconomics and monetary policy1. As far as
empirical results are concerned, our focus will be on Italy, a
traditional research field for studies in the credit view.
Current elaborations on the credit view pursue essentially the
same motivation: to explain the large impact that monetary shocks
are observed to exert on economic activity in spite of the many
weaknesses of real-balance effects. Thus, in the 1990s inclusion of
credit supply in the transmission mechanism significantly
                                        
1The comparison between the credit view and the money view is not our
main concern here. The interested reader may examine the contributions
in Mishkin (1995), and also Trautwein (2000). It should be stressed that
the differences among the two approaches are today regarded as less
important than in the past, and that most authors are ready to subscribe
to the idea that different transmission mechanisms co-operate in the
economy (see also below in this section).
2contributed to the resurgence of the view that "money matters" in
the explanation of real macroeconomic fluctuations. The typical
observed pattern taken as benchmark is one where: i) Monetary
interventions (mainly activated by changes in administered rates
and money-market funds rates) are followed by quick and large
response in money agreggates, total credit, and different measures
of real economic activity, and by slow and delayed adjustment of
price indeces (with the possible exception of spells of high inflation
with a wage-price spiral). ii) "Money matters" precisely because
different mechanisms co-operate in amplifying the impact of
monetary policy on aggregate demand, though their relative weight
may vary according to different institutional environments and
financial structures2.
The distinctive feature of  current developments in the credit
view is that the magnifying effect attributed to the role of credit
supply in  monetary transmission is grafted onto microeconomic
theories of capital market imperfections. The thrust of these
theories is the violation of the Modigliani-Miller theorem of perfect
substitutability among firms’ liabilities - a phenomenon known as
“financial hierarchy or “pecking order of funds” - which is regarded
as the stone that can kill two birds in the transmission mechanism
                                        
2Good overall presentations of this view can be found in e.g.
Mishkin (1995), Christiano et al. (1996), Goodfriend-King (1997),
AEA (1997), Blanchard (2000). Given the patent resemblance of this
view with the one prevailing in the 1960s, Goodfriend and King
(1997) have aptly coined the term "New Neoclassical Synthesis".
Innovations that warrant the qualification "new" have been
concentrated on two issues for which more rigorous theoretical
(microeconomic) and empirical investigation was required: a) the
functioning of assets and credit markets, especially as regards
financing firms' spending capacity, in the monetary transmission
mechanism, b) incomplete, delayed, or staggered price adjustments
( so-called "sticky prices")  vis-à-vis nominal shocks. Major
contributions to these issues are often identified also as “New
Keynesian Economics” (e.g. Gordon, 1990).
3problem: i) the well-established fact that investment expenditure
displays much less sensitivity to long-term interest rates than is
implied by the money view, and ii) the fact that firms’ spending
capacity is instead much more sensitive to, first, market value
fluctuations in their internal funds, and, second, credit supply
conditions.
However, several shortcomings still remain to be discussed
and resolved. Those  addressed here are the following.
First, existing empirical works based on macroeconomic
models consistent with the credit view have hitherto failed to deliver
robust results,  owing to the so-called "causation puzzle": namely,
inability to identifiy whether the observed positive correlation
between bank loans and output is really due to credit supply shifts
or whether it is instead due to credit demand shifts consistent with
the traditional monetary transmission mechanism (see e.g.
Kashyap-Stein, 1994, and the comment by Eichenbaum, 1994), or
even to a passive role of endogenous monetary aggregates over the
real business cycle (King-Plosser, 1984).
Second, on theoretical grounds, the credit view has been
historically associated with attempts to show that monetary policy
can have permanent effects on output and employment (Trautwein,
2000). Yet current works, being concentrated on how firms’
dependence on credit amplifies monetary shocks to aggregate
demand, namely investment expenditure, shed little light on the
issue of non-neutrality in long-run equilibrium, and in particular on
whether or not the latter depends exclusively on missing
adjustments of wages and prices. The majority of contributors to the
modern credit view tend to downgrade this issue with respect to ten
or twenty years ago, mainly for the pragmatic reasons supported by
empirical works showing that i) prices are in fact sticky, and that ii)
the real effects of monetary shocks are absorbed over time as prices
catch up with excess demand. However, it should be noted that this
kind of evidence is almost invariably derived from "impulse response
analyses" (i.e. simulations) based on estimated "a-theoretical
models" using the vector autoregression (VAR) technique (e.g.
Bernanke-Gertler, 1995; Christiano et al., 1996). Consequently, the
4alternative hypothesis that monetary shocks may have permanent
real effects cannot properly be tested against the other .
More importantly,  the alternative hypothesis cannot be
lightheartedly set aside within a consistent framework of the credit
view. Treating firms’ investment decision as a component of
aggregate demand as if it were independent of their production
decision, i.e. aggregate supply, is inconsistent from an
intertemporal point of view. Investment today is production
tomorrow. If capital market imperfections in some way transmit
monetary policy impulses to investment decisions, the effects
should also manifest themselves in current production decisions,
which must be consistent with the overall intertemporal production
path of each firm. Therefore, monetary policy may exert long-lasting
real effects because of its influence on aggregate demand and
aggregate supply. If aggregate demand and supply shift together in
the same direction, the  result observed is just the familiar pattern
of large adjustments in quantities and small ones in prices, quite
independently of reasons of “price stickiness” (Stiglitz, 1992;
Greenwald-Stiglitz, 1993b; Hahn-Solow, 1995)3. We believe that the
remarkably limited research on the supply-side effects of monetary
policy through capital market imperfections leaves a missing ring in
the transmission mechanism, and we shall devote part of the paper
to an assessment of progress in this direction.
In section 2 we introduce the main features of  current
developments in the credit view after a brief review of its modern
foundations in imperfect capital markets. We shall then expound
the main models of the "credit channels" of monetary transmission,
                                        
3These studies, too, in particular those by Stiglitz and co-authors,  are
generally also classified as New Keynesian Economics. However, their
authors are keen to stress the difference with respect to the other strand of
New Keynesian studies in which some kind of price stickiness is necessary
to obtain real effects of monetary shocks (see fn.2). Hence, from this point
of view, the  the credit view camp can be split between the contributors to
the New Neoclassical Synthesis, and the followers of the New Keyensian
Economics of imperfect capital markets (see Greenwald-Stiglitz, 1993b,
Delli Gatti-Tamborini, 2000).
5following the distinction suggested above between models of
aggregate demand (section 3) and models of aggregate supply
(section 4). Each approach is accompanied by a survey of the main
empirical results with particular reference to Italy. Section 5 sets
out our conclusions.
2. Foundations
The credit view has roots that go far back in history - as far
as the "bullion vs. currency" controversy of the nineteenth century,
one might say4. It is perhaps worth remembering that early
fundamental contributions date back to Wicksell (1898), Hawtrey
(1927), Keynes (1930), Schumpeter (1934), to name but a few. The
General Theory (Keynes, 1936), however, despite Keynes' (1937)
later recognition of the importance of firms' "finance motive" in the
demand for money, paved the way for the ascent of the money view
in monetary theory and macroeconomics, namely in the fashion of
the IS-LM model. The credit view was never fully dismissed,
however. In the American tradition it was also known as
"availability doctrine" (Roosa, 1951; Okun et al., 1969), and in the
'60s it was revived in Britain by the Radcliffe Report (1959) and later
by Kaldor's works on "endogenous money" (1982).
Today's revival of the credit view - which will be the main
subject of  this paper -  following the current endeavour to
theoretically re-found macroeconomics has a distinct focus on
capital market imperfections, especially as a consequence of
asymmetric information. Among the wide array of violations of the
Modigliani-Miller theorem arising from asymmetric information5,
scholars in the credit view concentrate on imperfect substitution
                                        
4See Trautwein (2000) for a thorough survey of predecessors.
5Discussions of the macroeconomic outlook of this literature can be found
in Gertler (1988), Gertler-Hubbard (1988), Hubbard (1998), Delli Gatti-
Tamborini (2000).
6among firms' liabilities and among banks' assets.  In this section we
introduce the building blocks of the modern credit view, and
describe its two main specifications: the "net-worth (or balance-
sheet) channel" and the "bank lending channel".
2.1. Firms' financial structure and bank intermediation
The sources of funds for firms are not perfect substitutes
because they carry differential costs. The cost of internal funds is
taken as the benchmark, since it is given by the opportunity cost of
employing funds in a given investment plan or at an appropriate
market rate. The cost of external funds, however, embodies an
increasing "external premium" charged by the capital markets on top
of the market rate as a consequence of moral-hazard or adverse-
selection risks entrenched in the agency relation with the firm's
management6. Therefore, individual firms are typically depicted as
facing a kinked cost schedule of funds, horizontal at the market
interest rate up to the amount of internal funds, and then upward
sloping. In addition, some firms may find no access to external
funds, i.e. they may be equity and/or or credit rationed.
The important consequence of firms' financial structure at
the macroeconomic level is that total investment comes to depend
on three factors: i) the benchmark market rate, ii) the external
premia on the various types of funds, iii) the extent of financially
constrained firms.
It is clear that banks as fund suppliers play a crucial role in
the financial structure depicted above. From this viewpoint, banks
find economic justification for their existence to the extent that they
are able to supply funds with a lower external premium than can
private agents in the open market, thereby lowering the average cost
of capital and increasing investment opportunities (this is true for
                                        
6Note that agency risks are firm-specific and different in nature from
traditional market risk. Hence the benchmark market interest rate is to be
understood as the rate relevant to the market-risk class of the firm.
7all firms, and for equity rationed firms in particular)7. The path-
breaking works by Townsend (1979), Diamond (1984), Gale and
Hellwig (1985) have demonstrated that the combination created by
the bank of sight deposits to collect funds vis-à-vis "standard debt
contracts" to allocate them is indeed the optimal solution to the
firm-intermediary agency problem on the one hand, and the
intermediary-lender agency problem on the other8.
The efficiency of bank intermediation arises to the extent that
the bank may have a comparative advantage in informational
activities. But  banks, too, may be unable (or unwilling) to bear the
costs of removing asymmetric information. The consequence is one
of  the best-known phenomena of capital market failure: credit
rationing9. However, credit rationing is a controversial result that
seems quite sensitive to the initial assumptions concerning
information and the means, other than the interest rate, that the
bank can use to screen the quality of firms. Also, credit rationing
has received less empirical support than equity rationing.10
On the whole, as Mayer (1988, 1990, 1994) and Hellwig
(1991) have forcefully stressed, credit rationing is likely to arise in
                                        
7Again we can only refer the reader to some valuable overviews of the so-
called "new theory of banking", such as Battacharya-Thakor (1993),
Marotta-Pittaluga (1993), Mayer (1994).
8The contract is optimal in the sense that it maximizes the borrower's
expected profit from being truthful under the constraint of minimizing the
informational costs of the lender.
9For reviews of the debate see also Jaffee-Stiglitz (1990), Ardeni-Messori
(1996).
10Italy, for instance, is a country were equity finance is much less
developed than in other industrial economies and credit is a pervasive form
of business finance; nonetheless, the evidence in favour of credit rationing
is rather weak, perhaps with the exception of less developed, more risky
Southern regions (e.g. Pittaluga, 1988; Angeloni et al., 1997). King (1986)
has found only mixed support for credit rationing in the U.S. data, while
Berger-Udell (1992) openly criticize the Stiglitz-Weiss approach in the light
of direct analysis of banking practices.
8cases of spot and anynomous loan operations, whereas bank credit
is a substitute for open-market funds to such a large extent
because banks provide a whole set of instruments and activities in a
repeated, long-term customer relationship that deal with
asymmetric information more efficiently than the market11. The
essential point in the credit-view perspective is that, for a significant
number of firms, bank loans are not easily substitutable, or not
substitutable at all, with other financial funds. On the other hand,
it also worth stressing that bank relationships in this view are not
necessarily the vehicle for magnification of monetary policy shocks
to firms' spending capacity. Quite the contrary: to the extent that
bank relationships are more efficient than market relationships,
both fims' spending capacity and banks' lending capacity would be
increasingly sheltered against external monetary disturbances.
Hence, in view of the discussion to follow, it should be borne in
mind that the issue of the importance of credit relationships in the
economy is in principle not synonymous with the issue of the
amplification of monetary shocks through credit channels12. Credit
relationships do amplify monetary shocks only if banks, too, are
unable to manage their assets in such a way as to protect their
lending capacity against monetary shocks.
2.3. Credit channels
The new foundations of firms' financial policies have given
rise to two variations on the theme of the role of credit supply in the
transmission mechanism.
                                        
11 The issue of long-term "relationship banking" is discussed in a recent
survey by Boot (2000).
12It also worth recalling that, historically, some proponents of the credit
view were motivated by fact that monetary aggregates and nominal
spending capacity in the economy so often seem out of control of the
monetary authorities. As is well known, this was the idea behind Wicksell's
(1898) credit theory of business cycles; the same idea motivated Kaldor's
(1982) revival of the credit view against the monetarist theory. On this
interpretation of the credit view see e.g. Moore (1988).
91) Net-worth channel (NWC). Monetary policy is identified with
open market operations able to alter asset prices, while the main
source of investment finance is seen in firms' internal funds13.
Hence, given the amount of profitable investment opportunities, the
actual level of investment in the economy responds weakly to long-
term interest rates but strongly to the value of the internal
resources available to firms, which in turn mainly depend on: i)
previous cash flow and retained profits, ii)  the market value of
firms' assets. This channel of investment determination implies that
monetary policy affects investment mostly through wealth effects on
firms' internal means of investment. A contractionary policy  which
drives firms' asset prices downwards, reduces the amount of
investment that can be financed at low cost by internal funds. Cet.
par., i) unconstrained firms should expose themselves towards
external high-cost funds to a larger extent, ii) constrained firms
should cut investment plans one to one. Yet, in the case of
unconstrained firms, access to bank credit also deteriorates during
a monetary contraction because firms' collateral market value
diminishes, and banks raise interest rates. As a result, the NWC
amplifies the impact of the monetary contraction even though firms'
investment decisions  depend little on open-market long-term rates.
2) Bank-lending channel (BLC). The BLC focuses on financial
structures where some important classes of firms are equity
rationed (or simply are not publicly quoted) and can at most
substitute between internal funds and bank loans. Usually, these
firms are also relatively small, so that internal funds would set a
severe constraint on aggregate investments. Therefore, firms'
spending capacity beyond internal funds is essentially related to the
price and amount of  credit available, and, indirectly, to the policy
determinants of credit supply14.  BLC models are generally more
specific than NWC ones in that they concentrate on credit supply
                                        
13Reference models are Greenwald et al. (1984), Gertler-Hubbard (1988),
Bernanke-Gertler, (1989, 1990), Kyiotaki-Moore (1997).
14the most representative theoretical works are Blinder-Stiglitz (1983),
Blinder (1987); Bernanke-Blinder (1988), Greenwald-Stiglitz (1988, 1990,
sec.1.3, 1993a), Stiglitz-Weiss (1992).
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shifts as the key element in the transmission mechanism. Monetary
policy is typically introduced in the form of changes in administered
rates and money-market rates, or of changes in banks' reserves.
These interventions modify the cost of funds for banks, which are
induced to change their interest rates. For banks which adopt credit
rationing schemes, changes in these schemes may also occur. For
these reasons, studies of the BLC have also developed more detailed
analyses of firms' funds management in the presence of credit
shifts, and banks' portofolio management in the presence of
monetary policy impulses.
Before proceeding it is worth bearing in mind that these
different specifications of the credit channels of monetary policy
have been developed within the general attitude towards eclectism
and pragmatism described in section 1. As a result, differences may
be of theoretical interest but are not considered to be dramatically
important by the authors concerned (e.g. Bernanke-Gertler, 1995).
Some models have room for both channels (e.g. Greenwald-Stiglitz,
1993a). In practice, one may note that models of the NWC have
more typically, though not necessarily, been employed to examine
problems of real growth and/or business cycle as a counterpart to
the real business cycle theory (e.g. Bernanke-Gertler, 1989, 1990;
Kyiotaki-Moore, 1997), which is not our main concern here15.
Instead, a large part of the macroeconomic empirical literature
concerned with monetary policy issues has privileged BLC models,
probably because of their more detailed treatment of financial
relationships at the various stages of the transmission mechanism
as explained above (e.g. Bernanke-Blinder, 1992; Bernanke, 1993;
Kashyap et al., 1993; Kashyap-Stein, 1994). This latter feature has
probably been an important motivation behind the large-scale use
of the BLC approach as regards Italy: where, as a matter of fact, the
contribution of internal marketable assets to corporate finance is
much less important than elsewhere, while firms' bank-dependence
is much more pervasive.
                                        
15See Delli Gatti-Tamborini (2000, Part III).
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However, in our view, although eclectism or agnosticism  may
be valuable attitudes in scientific research, they should not be
pushed too far. In the subsequent parts of the paper, we shall
organize our treatment according to the critical line of interpretation
introduced in section 1. That is to say, we shall distinguish the
credit-view production between models of investment and aggregate
demand (section 3), where the credit channels amplify the monetary
transmission to aggregate demand and the impact on real economic
activity is due to price stickiness, and models of aggregate supply
(section 4), which purport to show that the credit channels have
direct effects on firms' employment and output decisions and hence
on aggregate supply. The former class of models, which includes the
largest part of current production, naturally tends to emphasize the
complementarity between the credit channels and the traditional
monetary channel, moving towards a unified view that supports the
current re-foundation of  macroeconomics in the fashion of the
Neoclassical Synthesis. The latter class of models is instead more
sharply alternative to the money view, and contributes to a research
programme which seeks to recast Keynesian macroeconomics on
the basis of imperfect capital markets independently of auxiliary
microeconomic assumptions underlying sticky prices.
3. Models of investment and aggregate demand
One of the most successful macroeconomic models of the
credit view is the one proposed by Bernanke and Blinder (1988).
First, the model is directly comparable with the foundational
counterpart of the money view, i.e.  the traditional IS-LM model.
Second, in a simple way it allows a rich specification of the financial
structure of the economy.  The qualifying feature of the credit view
is firms' diversification of investment external finance. This is
introduced by assuming imperfect substitution between open-
market funds (bonds) and bank debt. Here we shall present a
slightly modified and enlarged version of the Bernanke-Blinder
model in order to highlight each of the above features, differences
with the money view, and the identification of specific credit effects.
12
We shall then briefly review the main results from empirical
research.
3.1. The benchmark model of the BLC
The economy consists of three classes of agents, households,
firms, and banks, plus the central bank. Goods and labour prices
are kept fixed in any given period of time (we omit the time index for
simplicity), so that all nominal values coincide with real ones and
output Q is fully determined by aggregate demand Y, which consists
of real consumption C and investment I. Investments can be
financed by issuing open-market bonds Bs or by demanding bank
loans Ld, and their amount depends on comparison between the
marginal efficiency of capital r and the real cost of funds. The two
kinds of funds differ in their real cost, rB and rL, respectively, and
each  is assumed to be gross substitute for the other, so that the
firms' balance sheet is the following (the signs underlying each
variable are the signs of the respective partial derivates):
(3.1) I = Bs + Ld
Bs = bf(r, rB, rL)
+    -   +
Ld = lf(r, rB, rL)
 +  +   -
Banks accept deposits D from households and hold a fraction
a of deposits as reserves  H  with the central bank16, while the
remainder is lent to firms by granting loans Ls or by buying bonds
Bb. The diversification of the banks' portfolio of loans is again
derived from the gross substitution hypothesis. Therefore the banks'
balance sheet is:
                                        
16The addition of free reserves would not essentially change the results of
the model.
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(3.2) Bd + Ls + H = D
H = aD
Bd = bb(rB, rL)D(1 - a)
  +    -
Ls = lb(rB, rL)D(1 - a)
   -   +
With respect to the traditional IS-LM model, we now have
three markets (money, credit and output) and three endogenous
variables (the interest rate on bonds rB, the interest rate on bank
loans rL, and output Q).
The money market must equate money supply M with money
demand, which for simplicity only consists of deposits D and takes
the conventional form D = D(rB, Y). Given the absence of cash, and
the reserve coefficient a, money supply is simply a multiple of the
monetary base H,  M = H/a. Since bank reserves are the sole
component of the monetary base, money market equilibrium
requires:
(3.3) H/a =  D(rB, Y)
which yields the value of  rB :
(3.4) ),,(
-++
a= HYrr BB
The signs of partial derivatives are the same as in standard
Keynesian theory. Equation (3.1)-(3.4) can also be used to trace the
usual LM locus in the (Y, rB) space as in 0
The credit market must equate supply of bank loans with
demand as given by the corresponding component of investment;
therefore:
(3.5) lb(rB, rL)D(1 - a) =  lf(r, rB, rL)
Since in money-market equilibrium D = H/a, the credit market
determines the value of rL :
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(3.6) rL = rL(r, rB, a, H)
             +  +  +  -
The relationship between rL and rB is one of the key features of the
model, and we shall comment on it in due time.
Output market equilibrium obtains when aggregate supply
equates aggregate demand. The latter is determined according to
(3.7) Y = Y(r, rB, rL)
+  - -
After substituting (3.6) for rL, equation (3.7) yields a downward
sloping locus of equilibrium pairs (Y, rB) similar to the IS curve
which is reproduced in figure 1. Yet this equation also embodies the
equilibrium value of rL established in the credit market, and hence
Bernake and Blinder call it the CC (commodity and credit) locus,
which plays a crucial role in the whole model, as we shall see.
Setting Q = Y,  and taking the equations for rB and rL into account,
the reduced form of Q is:
(3.8) Q = Q(r, a, Hb)
Figure 1. A monetary restriction in the CC-LM model
r
Q
LM
CC
B
AB
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This result resembles the usual one in the IS-LM models.
There are, however, several  important differences that attracted
close attention from monetary scholars and which we examine
below. To highlight the main points analytically, it is convenient to
examine the comparative statics of the three endogenous variables
(rB, rL, Q) taking the total differential of the equilibrium equations
(3.4), (3.6), (3.8) with respect to an infinitesimal change in the policy
variable dH, holding a and r constant (a partial derivative is
denoted by a subscript of the relevant variable with the sign
attributed in the text):
(3.9) drB = (DY/DrB)dQ - (1/aDrB)dH
(3.10) Hrr
f
rB
b
rL
Bf
rB
b
rL
f
rB
b
rB
L d
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=
(3.11) dQ = -QrBdrB - QrLdrL
1) Existence of the BLC. First of all, one notes immediately
that the above system collapses to the IS-LM model if drL = 0. The
credit channel is the set of relations that activate equation (3.10).
Monetary policy is identified with changes in banks' reserves H
determined by the central bank17. These changes affect both
households’ portfolio equilibrium (and hence the interest rate on
bonds as usual) as well as banks' portfolio equilibrium (and hence
the interest rate on bank loans). We can easily establish conditions
for the existence of the BLC or,  conversely, conditions for its
disactivation, which are:
                                        
17This is of course a simplification because there usually exists a market
for reserves with appropriate interest rates. Extensions in this direction
have been elaborated by Dale-Haldane (1993),  Bagliano-Favero (1995,
1998a). The ensuing problem of identifying monetary policy interventions
has prompted intense empirical research: see Gordon-Leeper (1994),
Bernanke-Mihov (1995), Bagliano-Favero (1998b).
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· investment demand is insensitive to the bank interest rate, QrL =
0
· firms are indifferent between open-market funds and bank debt,
lfrL ® ¥
· banks are indifferent between bonds and loans, lbrL ® ¥
It is therefore confirmed that imperfect substitutability both for
firms' liabilities and banks' assets is the crucial condition for the
BLC18.
1) The amplifying effect of the BLC.    The specific amplifying
effect on aggregate demand of the BLC can be seen in equation
(3.11) in connection with the parameter QrL. Consider the case in
which QrB is small, as repeatedly found by empirical research in
almost all industrialized countries (see also section 2), or that
¶rB/¶H is small; monetary policy still impacts on aggregate demand
through the BLC. Graphically, amplification (a large change in Q
and a small change in rB) is the result of the co-movement of the LM
and CC schedules triggered by a monetary contraction as in figure
1.
3) Identification of the BLC. Early works in search of the BLC
pointed out that co-movements of output and credit aggregates were
stronger, closer and faster than those between output and monetary
aggregates (e.g. Friedman-Kuttner, 1992). Current empirical
research has clarified that
                                        
18In reality, the issue of portfolio choices of banks should also cover their
liability side. In fact, the model presented here overstates the impact of Hb
on banks' loanable funds (see equations (3.2)). In the presence of an
attempt by the central bank to cut Hb and hence D, banks may well react
by issuing alternative, marketable liabilities like deposit certificates, etc.,
which are not subject to reserve requirements. If this substitutability is
high, the credit channel of monetary policy is weakened or inhibited
altogether (the right-hand addendum in equation (3.10) vanishes). This
problem has been object of lively debate, especially in the U.S. (e.g. Romer-
Romer, 1990, Miron et al., 1994).
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to find evidence of the lending channel, [...] you need to make a set of
identifying assumptions to argue that the supply, rather than the demand
for credit, has moved in response to a monetary policy shock
(Eichenbaum, 1994, p.257).
This point is highlighted by the model. Suppose that lbrL ® ¥, and
consider a monetary contraction dH < 0. The pattern of interest
rates predicted by equations (3.9) and (3.10) is
drL = 0, drB > 0
while the patterns of credit and output predicted by equations (3.5)
and (3.11) are respectively
dLd < 0, dQ < 0
That is to say, a positive correlation between bank loans and output
arises in spite of the absence of any autonmous contraction of
credit supply by banks.
Investigations of the BLC have then followed two
identification strategies, one that remains at the level of aggregate
models and data, and another that employs disaggregate models
and data. The former strategy exploits information contained in
equation (3.10), which indicates that after a monetary policy
intervention both open-market and bank interest rates should
respond together and in the same direction. Moreover, as
established by Dale and Haldane (1993), the spread between bank
rates and other rates should increase. The alternative strategy
focuses more closely on the microeconomic prerequisites of the BLC
(see section 2): i) the diversification hypothesis, by dint of which
evidence for substitution across firms' liabilities and banks' assets
is sought  after a monetary policy shock (e.g. Bernanke-Blinder,
1992; Kashyap et al., 1993; Kashyap-Stein, 1994b, 1997); ii) the
heterogeneity of firms, owing to which particular classes of firms are
expected to display a strong dependence of spending capacity on
bank credit (e.g. Gertler and Gilchrist, 1993, 1994, who initiated
this line of research). Following this approach, the so-called "cross-
sectional" effects of monetary policy have become an active area of
research .
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3.2. An overview of empirical research
It has long been thought that Italy is a good case-study for
scholars interested in the BLC of monetary policy. This is because,
among the major industrialized countries, Italy has a less developed
capital market and an industrial structure characterized by the
presence of a large number of small firms whose most important
financial resource is bank credit (Vicarelli, 1974; Angeloni et al.,
1997). The role of the credit market in the monetary transmission
mechanism has always been carefully monitored by the Italian
monetary authorities (see e.g. Bertocco, 1997), and it is explicitly
included in the Bank of Italy's econometric model (1997a). Not
surprisingly, there has recently been a proliferation of empirical
studies on the BLC in Italy.
These studies may be broadly divided into two groups:  one in
which empirical tests are based on aggregate time series analysis
and  use the VAR methodology to estimate impulse response
functions; and a second one which comprises more recent analyses
based on a disaggregate microeconomic approach. In recent years,
attention has also been paid to international comparisons and to
the problem of the possible heterogeneity of monetary policy
transmission in the EMU. For reasons of space, and in
consideration of the fact these studies do not specifically focus on
Italy, they are not discussed  here.19
                                        
19 Given the predominant view set out in section 3 that different
transmission mechanisms may account for the different amplitude,
and possibly speed, of monetary shocks to aggregate demand, the
issue  obviously has an important bearing on centralized monetary
policy-making. The first extensive study was  by Dornbusch et al.
(1998), who detected a number of indicators of heterogeneity of
transmission mechanisms. Further developments have found mixed
evidence. Adopting the disaggregate methodology  discussed below,
Favero et al. (1999) argue that asymmetries in monetary policy
transmission in Europe cannot be ascribed to cross-country
19
We begin our review by examining the first group of studies.
Buttiglione and Ferri (1994), and Bagliano and Favero (1995,
1998b) provided the first rigorous estimations of the BLC in Italy.
Both test an adapted version of the Bernanke-Blinder model in
which monetary policy shocks affect the economy through
exogenous variations of the interest rate in the market for banks
reserves, and they reach similar conclusions.
Buttiglione and Ferri (1994) present econometric evidence in
favour of the BLC on the basis of an unrestricted VAR model
estimated with monthly data running from 1988 to 1993. After
discussing two major episodes of monetary tightening in Italy
(March 1981 and June-September 1992), Buttiglione and Ferri
estimate a VAR that includes six endogenous variables, the
overnight rate (used as the monetary policy index), the rate on
government paper, the amount of credit granted by banks to
customers ( a proxy for credit supply) , the amount of credit actually
drawn ( a proxy for credit demand), the average interest rate on
loans, and the index of industrial production. They also add four
exogenous variables, the industrial production price index and three
dummies intended to capture specific important regulatory
interventions by Banca d’Italia in 1988 and 1989. The VAR is
identified with a Cholesky decomposition in which the variable
ordering is as just described. On analysing the impulse response
functions from the VAR, Buttiglione and Ferri find that after a one
                                                                                                       
differences in the response of bank loans to monetary policy, and
that in the case of the 1992 episode there is no evidence of a BLC
operating in the four major continental economies. De Arcangelis
and Giovannetti (2000) point out that apparent cross-country
similarities are in fact restricted to sectoral similarities in different
countries as regards firm-bank relationships and responsiveness to
monetary shocks. Different sectoral weights in different economies
may well account for different effects of monetary shocks. Using
aggregate macro-data, Fountas and Papagapitos (2001) point out
that the BLC is especially significant for Germany and Italy
compared to all the other countries in the Union.
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percent positive shock to the overnight rate, the spread between the
interest rate on loans and the rate on government paper increases.
As explained in the previous section, this is generally considered to
be a signal of the BLC. The overnight  rate also has a negative
impact on credit supply. Finally, shocks to credit supply are
positively correlated with the index of industrial production, and
they account for about 26% of production index variance.
Buttiglione and Ferri’s conclusion is that their analysis provides
support for the existence of a BLC in Italy.
Bagliano and Favero’s (1995) analysis is twofold. On the one
hand, it  qualitatively analyses four episodes of monetary restriction
in the period 1979-199320, showing that strong spread increases
are observable in all cases. On the other hand, it tests the
implication of the theoretical model with the help of two
cointegrated VAR systems fitted to monthly data covering the 1982-
1993 period. VAR identification is achieved with the help of
standard Cholesky triangular decomposition. The first step consists
in testing the response of the spread between the bank loan rate
and the Treasury bill rate to innovations in the policy rate (the rate
on the Bank of Italy’s repurchase agreement operations). Since
Bagliano and Favero’s  results show that the spread may be taken
to be an indicator of monetary policy, in a second stage they test the
impact of the spread on industrial production and inflation. Their
main finding is that impulse response functions  show that
innovations in the spread have a significant negative impact on
industrial production with a lag varying from 6 to 12 months.
Bagliano and Favero also conclude that the latter result can be
interpreted as evidence that a BLC operates in the Italian economy.
Among more recent developments mention should be made of
Chiades and Gambacorta (2000), who extend the Bernanke-Blinder
model to the case of an open economy under a quasi fixed exchange
rate regime. In their model, Chiades and Gambacorta add an
                                        
20 The timing of the monetary restriction episodes was as follows: from
the second half of 1979 up to the beginning of 1981; beginning of 1985;
first half of 1986; end of 1992.
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exchange rate channel to the traditional money and credit channels
of monetary policy transmission and analytically derive the
conditions for their relative importance, which is then empirically
tested by means of a structural VAR (SVAR) analysis. One
implication of the theoretical model is that it helps solve the so-
called “exchange rate puzzle”, namely the fact that sometimes, after
a monetary restriction, the exchange rate depreciates instead of
appreciating. In fact, if the leftward movement of the CC curve is
sufficiently large, the equilibrium of the economy is achieved below
the traditional Mundell-Fleming BB curve, so that the exchange rate
depreciates.
Turning to the empirical part of the paper, Chiades and
Gambacorta estimate a SVAR with six endogenous variables
(production index, consumer price index, three month interest rate,
Italia lira/DM exchange rate, interest spread, nominal wage index),
three exogenous variables (German consumer price index, three
month German interest rate, world raw materials price index) and
five dummy variables which capture monetary policy interventions
by Banca d’Italia during the exchange rate crisis of 1992 and the
Mexican crisis of 1995. These dummies are introduced to obtain
VAR residuals that are normally distributed. The sample period
runs from 1984 to 1998 and the data have a monthly frequency. On
the basis of the methodology described in Giannini (1992)21,
Chiades and Gambacorta identify the SVAR by imposing structural
links that go from the exchange rate to the interest  rate, from
prices to wages, and from the interest rate to the spread, and by
assuming that reduced-form shocks on the financial part of their
model (interest rate, exchange rate and the spread) have no
contemporaneous effect on the real part of  the system (production
and prices). The impulse response functions  obtained show that, in
the short run, monetary policy shocks are diffused into the economy
by both the money and the credit channel, while an “exchange rate
puzzle” arises, since the exchange rate does not respond to interest
                                        
21 Using Giannini’s terminology, Chiades and Gambacorta estimate an AB
model. For careful examination of the use of SVAR as a method for
measuring monetary policy see Bagliano and Favero (1998).
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rate shocks. As to the long run, Chiades and Gambacorta’s results
confirm the “neutrality hypothesis”: monetary policy permanently
affects prices but not output. They also find that the BLC exerts
greater influence on output than the money channel, while the
reverse is true when the effects on prices are considered. Finally,
they claim that, consistently with the theoretical model, the
importance of the BLC in Italy may provide an alternative
explanation for the relative independence of Italy’s monetary policy
during the EMS period.
Although quite common, the use of aggregate time series in
the empirical analysis of the BLC has recently been criticized on the
grounds that it prevents researchers from clearly identifying and
separating credit demand from credit supply shocks (see section 3).
The suggested solution is to employ disaggregate micro data on both
banks and firms in order to  detect specific "microeconomic"
implications of the credit view.
In the first place, the identification scheme of the BLC can be
based on the prediction that the effects of monetary policy on banks
depend on their characteristics and are likely to be differentiated
(Kashyap et al., 1993; Kashyap-Stein, 1994b, 1997). Angeloni et al.
(1995) have made the first attempt to investigate how the
heterogeneous nature of the Italian banking system affects the
credit channel using a partial disaggregate approach that enables
them to examine the different responses of selected groups of banks
to monetary shocks is due to. They classify Italian banks into four
groups. The first two  (A1 and A2 in their paper) include the 15
largest and 25 smallest banks measured by the total size of their
loan portfolio, while the other two groups (B1 and B2) include the
15 largest and 25 smallest banks measured by the average size of
their loans. Even though there is some degree of overlap among the
four groups, Angeloni et al. claim that it is not particularly large, so
that tests of hypothesis that distinguish A1-A2 from B1-B2 can be
carried out. According to the authors, the portfolio size criterion is
best suited to identifying the bank balance sheet characteristics
that are likely to make the loan supply  responsive to monetary
shocks, while the second classification criterion takes into account
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the size of the borrower under the hypothesis that loan size and
borrower size are positively correlated.
The  behaviour of the alternative bank groups is then
empirically tested by measuring their response to changes in the
cost of bank loans. Angeloni et al. estimate a VAR for groups A and
B including the following variables: three month interbank rate, the
average yield on Government fixed-coupon bonds, the average rate
on deposits, and the average rate on loans. As to the long run
properties of the VAR, Angeloni et al. identify five cointegrating
vectors, while the short run dynamic analysis is performed with the
help of a linear transformation of  the system in which the variables
are the average deposit rate, the deposit rate spread, the average
loan rate, the loan rate spread and the loan-government bond yield
spread within both groups. Finally, identification of the VAR is
achieved and impulse response functions are computed assuming a
standard triangular Choleski decomposition. Overall, the results are
favourable to the credit view of monetary policy transmission and
are consistent with those found by studies based on aggregate time
series data. In fact, following a negative monetary shock, the spread
between loan rates and bond market rates increases in all the bank
groups. As to the rate spread between  "large" and "small" and
between "large-loan" and "small-loan" banks, Angeloni et al. find
that this increases, and that “large” banks respond more promptly
to monetary shocks than do smaller banks. This latter result is at
odds with Kashyap and Stein (1994), and it is explained by the
authors by the fact that small banks have closer ties with their
customers and usually concentrate most of their borrowing at a
single institution.
In a related paper, Conigliani et al. (1997) test the importance
of the intensity of the relationship between banks and firms in the
transmission of monetary policy, using data on 33,808 non
financial firms in the year 1992. In the first part of their analysis,
they test the determinants of the level of and the change in the
interest rates that banks charge to customers. In the second part
they investigate the link between  banks-firms relations and the
availability of credit after a monetary shock. As explanatory
variables they use indexes of concentration and stability. A low
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concentration index signals the existence of mutiple banking
relationships, while a high stability index is a proxy for long lasting
customer relationship. The estimate of probit equations shows that
firms with both high stability and low concentration indexes have a
greater probability of being sheltered from the interest effects of
restrictive monetary policy and  smaller probability of incurring
credit rationing. Since small Italian firms display both
characteristics, Conigliani et al. conclude that, in the case of the
1992 monetary restriction, their analysis does not confirm the
prediction of the BLC insofar as small firms are concerned.
Although studies like those by Angeloni et al. move a step
towards a more disaggregate empirical analysis of the BLC, they rely
essentially on the same indirect VAR methodology employed in the
previous group of works. A recent study presenting truly micro-
based evidence on the different channels of monetary transmission
mechanisms in Italy and Europe is the one by Favero et al. (1999),
who use  balance sheet data from a sample of 651 banks in France,
Germany, Italy and Spain to study the response of banks’ loans to
the Europe-wide monetary restriction of 1992.  Cross-sectional
differences among banks are identified with the help of two
variables: the “strength” and the “size” of banks’ balance sheets.
The “strength” variable is a measure of banks’ liquidity and is
defined as the sum of cash, securities and reserves as a fraction of
total assets22. The more “liquid”  a bank is, the more it can insulate
its supply of loans against external monetary policy shocks. The
“size” variable, as previously pointed out when discussing the
Angeloni et al. paper, is useful because it is normally assumed that
larger banks are able to escape monetary restrictions by issuing a
variety of financial instruments that allow them to raise the funds
necessary to back  their lending activity23.
Favero et al. divide their sample into ten deciles and compare
the distribution of banks’ total assets in each country with the same
                                        
22 See Kayshap and Stein (1997).
23 Favero et al. observe that banks of comparable size do not necessarily
have the same “strength”.
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parameter in Europe finding no evidence of inter-country
asymmetries in the size distribution. On the other hand, banks in
Italy and Spain appear to be relatively stronger than those in France
and Germany. A distinctive feature of  the latter country is that
large banks are “weaker” than smaller ones. The presence and
quantitative importance of the credit channel is then finally tested
with an heteroscedastic consistent regression in which the
percentage changes in loans from 1991 to 1992 are regressed on
the percentage changes in bank reserves, the “strength” and ten
dummies that discriminate banks by deciles of the distribution on
total assets of all four countries in the sample. The regression
specification allows for the possibility that loans responses to shifts
in monetary policy may be non linear. The estimates results are
negative for the BLC, since the tests performed are unable to reject
the hypothesis that the response of loans to reserve changes is zero.
A country by country analysis of the results, however, shows some
interesting features. In Germany, the largest banks use their
"strength" to counteract the effect of monetary restrictions, while
the smallest ones react by expanding their loans - a finding which
reverses the credit-view's prediction. Italian and Spanish banks
display the same behaviour but size and strength play no role in
determining the response of large banks to policy shocks. Finally, in
France  differences in size have no effects at all and the aggregate
result is confirmed for all deciles.
Favero et al. entirely focus on the lender side of the credit
market. Microeconomic evidence from the borrower side is instead
presented by Dedola and Lippi (2000), who report data on the
monetary transmission mechanism based on the reaction to
monetary shocks of 21 manufacturing industries in 5 OECD
countries (France, Germany, Italy, the UK and the USA). The aim of
this paper is to verify the cross-heterogeneity of real effects of
unanticipated monetary shocks and to explain such effects in terms
of industry characteristics compatible with theories of monetary
transmission. Dedola and Lippi start their analysis by identifying
and estimating the unanticipated component of monetary policy in
the five countries examined, following the method proposed by
Christiano et al. (1998). They find that unexpected increases in the
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short term interest rate have a persistent negative impact on
industrial production in all five countries, which peters out after
three years. In the European countries, an exchange rate
appreciation also emerges. As to country specific behaviour,
Germany and Italy display a slower output response, while the
effects are more rapid in France, the UK and the USA.
The next step in Dedola and Lippi’s analysis is to measure
the industry effects of monetary policy. After estimating 100 VARs
and graphing the  associated impulse response functions, they find
that industry response is quite different within each country. In
general, in food and textile industries the impact of policy shocks is
equal to or less than  average aggregate industrial production, while
in heavy industries such as iron, machinery and motor vehicles the
response is much greater than in other industries. This
heterogeneity of industrial response is further explored by
examining the interest rate sensitivity of each industry and  the
indebtedness capacity of firms. The latter characteristic is proxied
by firm size and several measures of financial leverage. Since,
according to the credit view, credit constrained firms have a lower
leverage ratio on average, and are smaller than unconstrained
firms, the prediction of an inverse relationship between the
effectiveness of monetary policy and the level of these variables is
tested with a regression analysis in which the 24-month output
elasticity is the dependent variable. Dedola and Lippi find that the
impact of monetary policy is stronger in industries that produce
durable goods (interest rate sensitive), are more capital intensive,
and have smaller borrowing capacity. Their conclusion is that the
traditional interest rate channel of monetary transmission is
important in the countries in their panel, but also that the credit
channel is significant and has the same magnitude as the money
channel. The importance of cross-sectoral differences behind
aggregate responses to monetary shocks has also been confirmed
for EMU contries by De Arcangelis and Giovannetti (2000), along
similar lines of analysis.
Given the large number of works and their different
econometric methodologies, the main results and characteristics of
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studies on the BLC in Italy just reviewed are summarized in table 1
for the reader’s convenience.
Table 1. Summary of empirical studies on the credit channel in Italy
Methodology Estimation
technique
Sample period Main results
Buttiglione-
Ferri (1994)
Aggregate
time series
analysis
Unrestricted
VAR
1988-1993
(monthly data)
Overnight rate affects the
spread positively and the
credit supply negatively;
shocks to credit supply
account for about 26% of
output variance
Bagliano -
Favero (1995,
1998b)
Aggregate
time series
analysis
Cointegrated
VAR
1982-1993
(monthly data)
Spread is an indicator of
monetary policy shocks and
has a significant  negative
impact on industrial
production
Angeloni et al.
(1997)
Disaggregate
analysis of
behaviour of
different bank
groups
Cointegrated
VAR
1987-1993
(monthly data)
Spread increases in response
to monetary policy shocks;
“large banks” respond more
promptly than “small
banks”to policy shocks
Conigliani et
al. (1997)
Disaggregate
cross-section
analysis of
micro data on
non financial
firms
Case study;
Probit
estimation
1992 Contrary to the prediction of
the credit view literature,
small firms have a higher
probability of being sheltered
from monetary restrictions.
2Favero et al.
(1999)
Disaggregate
analysis using
microeconomi
c  balance
sheet data
from
individual
banks in four
European
countries
Case study;
cross-
sectional
analysis and
OLS with
heteroscedasti
city consistent
standard
errors
1992 No evidence of BLC in France,
Germany, Italy and Spain
3Chiades-
Gambacorta
(2000)
Aggregate
time series
analysis;
account for
the working of
an “exchange
rate” channel
of monetary
shocks
Structural
VAR
1984-1998
(monthly data)
In the short run, policy
shocks affect income and
prices via both a money and a
credit channel; money is
“neutral in the long run; the
working of a credit channel
helped  isolate Italian
monetary policy against
foreign shocks.
Dedola-Lippi
(2000)
Disaggregate
analysis using
microeconomi
c data on 21
manufacturin
g industry in
5 OECD
countries
Structural
VAR
1975-1997
(monthly data)
Unanticipated monetary
policy shocks have long
lasting real effects and are
transmitted through both the
interest rate and the credit
channel with  broadly the
same intensity
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4. Modelling the missing ring: monetary policy, credit and
aggregate supply
In section 1 we put forward reasons why the present
tendency to restrict research on  credit channels within the
boundaries of aggregate demand theory is unsatisfactory. In this
section we wish to propose a framework for analysis of the links
between monetary policy, credit and aggregate supply. The main
goal is to assess i) whether a connection may exist between
monetary policy and aggregate supply, and ii) whether the observed
pattern of large quantity adjustments and small price adjustments
can be ascribed to supply-side effects with no need for auxiliary
assumptions concerning imperfect price determination.
Though models in this vein are usually highly specific in
terms of microfoundations and economic structures, we have
chosen to adopt a generic representation of agents' behavioural
functions which favours the most direct comparison and
complementarity  with the results presented in the previous
sections ( conversely, specific models can be obtained from our
framework by means of  appropriate specifications of functions or
market structures). We present a general equilibrium framework
with three markets (labour, credit and ouput) and three classes of
agents (firms, households and banks, including the central bank),
but for the sake of brevity  in the main body of the text we only
develop the aggregate supply part of the model, which is the
theoretical kernel of the transmission mechanism, whereas the
derivation of the other parts of the model can be found in the
Appendix.
4.1. Firms and the levered aggregate supply
As explained in section 1, if capital market imperfections are
responsible for most of the transmission of monetary policy to
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investment, then analysis cannot be limited to aggregate demand,
because current production decisions too should be consistent with
the firm's intertemporal path. Quite naturally, this principle
emerges in a group of models of credit economies that address
issues in growth and business cycle theory24. However, to our
knowledge these models have not generated substantial empirical
research, and they have had little impact on standard monetary
macroeconomics and monetary policy theory, which still
concentrates on aggregate demand effects. The reason may reside in
the research strategies and idioms used, so that the above-
mentioned models are typically "all real", have highly specific
microfoundations, and leave little room for detailed analysis of
monetary and financial transactions among central bank, banks
and the economy.
A more promising route is offered by a string of papers by
Greenwald and Stglitz (1988a, 1990, 1993a) the core of which is a
"levered aggregate supply", that is,  an aggregate supply function
derived from the assumption that firms should borrow their working
capital25. In fact - as shown by Dimsdale (1995), Delli Gatti-
Gallegati (1997), Tamborini (1999), Tamborini and Fiorentini (2000)
- this aggregate supply theory is amenable to macroeconomic and
monetary policy analysis and empirical testing in a way fully
compatible and comparable with the current standard (namely
microfounded AD-AS models, see fn.2)26. Note also that the levered
aggregate supply is an intertemporal function which obeys the basic
principle mentioned above. In fact working capital is nothing but a
particular kind of investment (on this point see also Greenwald-
                                        
24Farmer (1984), Gertler-Hubbard (1988), Bernanke-Gertler, (1989, 1990),
Hahn-Solow (1995), Kyiotaki-Moore (1997). See also the overviews by
Greenwald-Stiglitz (1993b), Delli Gatti-Tamborini (2000, Part III).
25There is apparent connection with Keynes's idea of a "monetary theory of
production" (1933) and more specifically with his (1937) "finance motive" in
the theory of the aggregate demand for money.
26The connection between credit and aggregate supply has likewise been
examined by Blinder (1987) and Stiglitz-Weiss (1992), who, however, focus
on the role of credit rationing, which is not our concern here.
29
Stiglitz, 1993a). Moreover,  bank-dependent firms typically rely on
credit in order to finance not only fixed but also working capital,
and businessmen react negatively to increases in bank interest
rates first and foremost as increases in general production costs27.
The key ingredients of the Greenwald-Stiglitz (G-S) theory of
aggregate supply  are:
i) a sequential economy, with discrete time periods indexed by t,
t+1, ..., where production takes 1 period of time regardless of the
scale of  production
ii) firms have to pay for inputs (labour) in each t before they are able
to sell output in t+1, and they can start a new production round in
t+1 only after "closing accounts" (i.e. all output has been sold out)
iii) firms face price uncertainty in the form of a probability
distribution of each firm's individual sale price around the market
price of output28
iv) full equity rationing of firms, so that firms' demand for working
capital (the wage bill) is met either by internal funds ("equity base")
or by bank credit in a competitive credit market
v) standard debt contracts between banks and firms29.
To gain full understanding of the model, the reader should
bear in mind the flow chart of the time structure of transactions
illustrated in figure 2.
                                        
27See e.g. Gertler-Gilchrist (1993, 1994), Rondi et al. (1998), Badocchi
(1998). It should also be noted that bank-dependence for short term credit
is more pervasive than for long term investment plans, as even large firms
with access to the open market issue short term commercial paper to a
very limited extent.
28This form of randomization of individual selling prices is left unexplained
by  Greenwald and Stiglitz, and we do not explain it either. A cause may be
some kind of imperfect arbitrage on the output market, such as badly
connected sale points or "islands".
29Fiorentini and Tamborini (2000) prove that standard debt contracts are
indeed optimal under these assumptions.
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Figure 2. Work, production and consumption in the sequence economy
WORK PRODUCTION
CONSUMPTION
WORK PRODUCTION
CONSUMPTION
t-1
t
t+1
All firms j produce a homogeneous output by means of a
common labour technology with decreasing marginal returns, so
that
(4.1) Q(t)jt+1 = Q(Njt), QN > 0, QNN < 0
The sale price of each firm in t+1 is the outcome of a random
market process around the "average market price" of output Pt+1,
given by the law
(4.2) Pjt+1= Pt+1ujt+1
where ujt+1 is a i.i.d. random variable with cumulative function F
and expected value E(ujt+1) = 1.
To pay for labour, firms can spend out of their existing
internal funds or can borrow from banks. However, given our
purposes here we focus on a pure BLC version of the model, i.e.
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with no internal funds retained by firms30. Given the money wage
rate Wt, the amount of borrowing by a firm at time t is therefore
(4.3) Ldjt = WtNjt
against which, the firm is committed to paying in t+1
· LdjtRt if the solvency state Pjt+1Q(t)jt+1 > LdjtRt is declared
· Pjt+1Q(t)jt+1 if the default state Pjt+1Q(t)jt+1 < LdjtRt  is declared
      with deterministic monitoring31
The default state also includes bankruptcy, i.e. firm's
foreclosure. Given that bankruptcy occurs in all states such that
Pjt+1Q(t)jt+1 < LdjtRt , after little manipulation we see that this
condition is equivalent to
(4.4) ujt+1 < LdjtRt/Pt+1Q(t)jt+1 º u*jt+1
i.e. whenever the individual price relative to the market ujt+1 falls
below a critical value u*jt+1 equal to the firm's debt/revenue ratio.
Knowing the probability distribution F(ujt+1), the bankruptcy
probability of the firm is:
(4.5) Prob(ujt+1 < u*jt+1) = F(u*jt+1) º fjt
Bankruptcy may or may not have pecuniary and non-
pecuniary extra-costs for firm's managers (like fees, administrative
costs, etc.). We exclude these costs here32, so that the levered firm's
expected profit maximization is simply:
                                        
30The NWC implication of the model is particularly important in the
orginal G-S papers as a way to generate endogenous dynamics for
business cycle analysis (see also Delli Gatti-Tamborini, 2000, Part III).
However, the absence of internal funds is a more natural basic assumption
for small competitive firms.
31Deterministic monitoring means that the firm is monitored and its true
state is observed with certainty.
32 These costs are assumed to be present and play an important role in
the original G-S papers because they force managers to take  account of
the expected bankruptcy cost in their profit maximization, even though
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(4.6) maxN  Zejt+1 = Pet+1Q(t)jt+1 - WtNjtRt
Given the assumed time structure of transactions, the firm
employs labour and demands credit for the new production period t
after the previous period's output has been sold out at price Pt
(indeed, as we shall see, the price of ouput in each period is fully
determined by the previous period's exogenous variables). Hence we
can conveniently use Pt as numeraire for all nominal variables,
denoting with wt º Wt/Pt the current real wage rate and with pt+1 º
Pt+1/Pt the 1-period price growth factor (inflation for short). Hence,
the first order condition for a real profit's maximum is
QN = wtRt/pet+1
which states that the firm employs labour up to the point where its
marginal product equates the real expected marginal cost, which is
the compound real cost of labour and credit. Under standard
assumptions concerning the production function, the optimal
employment level can be written as
(4.7) Ndjt = Nd(wt, Rt /pet+1)
      -        -  
We have thus obtained the typical labour demand function of
the levered firm. In addition to the standard negative dependence on
the real wage rate, its main features due to bank debt are: i) labour
demand is decreasing in the real interest rate, ii) it is systematically
lower than the standard labour demand for any positive interest
rate
                                                                                                       
they are risk neutral. In this way, bankruptcy probability shows up in the
aggregate supply function as a specific consequence of firm's bank-
dependence, whereas in a perfect capital market firm's risk would be
diverisfied away by equity holders. Instead of adding auxiliary assumptions
on bankruptcy costs and their shape, we propose a simpler solution: there
are no such costs, but, as we shall see, bankuptcy probability enters the
model via bank interest rates in the form of credit risk premium (which is
also a specific consequence of bank-dependence).
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Output supply is easily derived from labour demand by
means of the production function (4.1), i.e.:
(4.8) Q(t)jt+1 = Q(Nd(wt, Rt /pet+1))
     -         -
Labour demand (4.7) and output supply (4.8) are the core of
the supply-side economics of the credit view. They show that firms'
employment and production decisions are affected by credit supply
conditions to the extent that i) these entail changes in the interest
rate due to banks, and ii) these changes are to some extent
transmitted to the real expected marginal cost, i.e. to the extent that
wage rate, interest rate and expected price changes do not exactly
offset each other. This a crucial aspect of the model which has not
received enough attention in the literature. Its importance will
become clearer once aggregate supply has been embedded in the
rest of the economic system.
4.2. Macroeconomic equilibrium and monetary policy effects
At the beginning of each production period t firms plan
labour demand, credit demand and output supply as explained in
the previous paragraph. In so doing they interact with households
in the labour market and with banks in the credit market. In the
next period t+1 firms will interact again with households in the
output market and with banks in order to close their accounts
before starting a new production round. Here we only reproduce the
relevant functions concerning households' labour supply and
output demand, and banks' credit supply, which are fully derived in
the Appendix. Given that firms, and all other agents, are ex-ante
identical, we can treat individual functions as representative of
aggregates, which we shall do by dropping the subscripts.
At the beginning of each t, each household h owns deposits
from the previous period Dt-1, can sell labour Nsht at the market
wage rate Wt, and earn WtNsht. Hence the household can consume
C(t)htPt out of t-1 production by spending Dt-1, and save current
income in bank deposits Dht for consumption in t+1 C(t)ht+1, on the
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expectation of price Pet+1. The resulting labour supply and output
demand functions are, respectively,
(4.9) Nst = Ns(wt, pet+1)
  +    -
(4.10) C(t)t+1 = C(Dt )/Pt+1
     +
Banks collect deposits from households at zero rate, and offer
standard debt contracts at the rate Rt in a competitive market, as
explained in the previous paragraph. Each loan at time t to a firm
embodies a default risk fjt. On inspection of the definition of fjt, and
of the solution of the production programme of each firm, we find
that fjt = ft for all j. The bank can insure itself against this risk by
borrowing from the central bank at the gross rate Kt , i.e. it can
cover all default states Lsbtft under the obligation to repay the
premium LsbtftKt in t+1. Since firms are ex-ante homogenous,
competitive pressure will drive the expected return on loans to zero
at a single? market rate Rt, i.e.:
(4.11) LsbtRt(1 - ft) - LsbtftKt - Lsbt = 0
whic implies
(4.12) Rt = (1 - ft)-1 + ft(1 - ft)-1Kt
The result is that the bank interest rate is determined as a credit
risk premium above the central bank rate33. At this rate, credit
supply is infinitely elastic. Obviously, since in this model the central
bank pegs the interest rate, the creation of monetary base is
endogenous, being equal to the risk-adjusted fraction of bank loans,
Lsbtft
The full model is therefore given by the following equilibrium
conditions:
Labour market
                                        
33Note that for ft = 0, Rt = 1, and ¶Rt/¶ft|fÎ[0,1] > 0.
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(4.13) Nd(wt, Rt/pet+1) =  Ns(wt, pet+1)
Credit market
(4.14) Lt = WtNt
(4.15) Rt = (1 - ft)-1 + ft(1 - ft)-1Kt
Output market
(4.16) Q(Nd(wt, Rt/pet+1)) = C(Dt )/Pt+1
In order to study the comparative statics of this model in the
same fashion as in section 3, let us consider two exogenous
impulses from what we may call the "credit variables": dKt, which
represents a monetary policy intervention, and dft, which
represents a change in credit risk.34 In order to focus on key
supply-side factors without loss of generality we have set C(Dt ) = Dt.
By virtue of the rational expectations hypothesis, we obtain the
following intertemporal equilibrium variations in the real wage wt,
output Q(t)t+1 and inflation pt+1:
(4.17) 
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This result can be used to examine and discuss theoretical
and empirical issues in the credit view. Here we restrict discussion
to two main testable implications of the model. The first concerns
                                        
34In order to separate off Kt and ft in the equation of Rt, it is convenient to
linearize it by means of the first-order Taylor expansion around K0 = 1,
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the non-neutrality of credit variables, the second concerns the
correct identification of the credit channel for empirical analysis.
4.3. Non-neutrality
First of all, system (4.17) yields the following non-neutrality
proposition:
(P1) The REE real variables, employment and output, are negatively
correlated with the credit variables if QN < 1,  Nsp  ¹ Nsw .
This is, for obvious reasons, the most controversial issue.
Whilst by standard reasoning one may expect  credit risk to be a
"real" phenomenon with "real" effects, one may find it less plausible
that a "monetary" phenomenon such as the nominal discount rate
has exactly the same real effects.  Our model, where neither price
stickiness nor "money illusion" are present, sheds light on the
conditions under which non-neutrality holds.
 First, the core of the transmission mechanism are the
following elements: i) shifts in credit supply that ii) permanently
alter the real expected marginal cost of firms, as a consequence of
the compound change in interest rate, the wage rate and expected
inflation, and consequently, iii) permanent changes in employment
and output. Second, there are three key parameters that rule the
effects of this mechanism: QN ,  Nsp , Nsw . In what follows, we shall
discuss some issues connected with these two points, and with
particular reference to the discount rate.
1) Provided that Nsp  ¹ Nsw , the responsiveness of  ouput to
changes in the discount rate depends on the output elasticity to
labour inputs QN. The condition  QN < 1 can be regarded as
consistent with non-increasing returns to production in a large
class of production functions (the Cobb-Douglas function is the
typical example). Hence we can consider this condition as
sufficiently general according to current theoretical standards.
2) The condition Nsp  ¹ Nsw is more complex. Nsw  measures
labour-supply changes in relation to the current real wage. As
explained in the Appendix, Pt relative to Wt acts as a wealth effect,
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determining the amount of consumption available during the
working period t and, indirectly, the amount of labour supply. At
the same time, Nsp measures the reaction of labour supply to
changes in the intertemporal consumption profile induced by
changes in expected inflation. Note that the labour supply function
that we have obtained nests two noteworthy special cases. The first
is the well-known New Classical function à la Sargent-Wallace
where labour supply only depends on the expected real wage, which
obtains if Nsp  = Nsw. The second is the function adopted by
Greenwald and Stiglitz (1993a), Delli Gatti and Gallegati (1997), and
others, where labour supply only depends on the current real wage,
Nsp = 0,  i.e. workers ignore future consumption. The former
specification leaves the system undetermined under rational
expectations. The latter ensures that dwt/dKt < 0, dpt+1/dKt < 0.
Yet both special cases seem to impose unwarranted restrictions.
3) In general, the relative magnitude of Nsp  and Nsw
measures the intensity of intertemporal substitution effects on
labour supply. As is well known, this factor has played a major role
in the development of the real business cycle theory. Whereas that
theory has been weakened by the need for implausibly high
intertemporal substitution effects, if Nsp  < Nsw (which implies D < 0)
the credit transimission mechanism does yield the plausible
negative correlations dwt/dKt, dpt+1/dKt < 0. The reason can be
explained with the help of figure 3.
Assume the economy is in equilibrium at points A, and
consider the case that the central bank raises the discount rate dKt
> 0. This displaces the credit supply function (left-hand panel), Rt
increases and generates a higher (expected) real interest rate for
firms (due to higher Rt and lower pet+1). Hence labour demand shifts
downwards (right-hand panel). As the nominal wage rate Wt falls
relative to Pt, workers are induced to supply less labour (along the
previous supply schedule), while lower pet+1 induce them to supply
more (shifting the supply schedule downwards), adding further
competitive pressure on wt.  The condition Nsp  < Nsw  implies that
this latter effect is weaker than the former, so that the overall fall of
wt does not compensate for the rise in the real interest rate, thus
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leaving  firms with higher real marginal costs. The consequence is a
net cut in employment and output.
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Figure 3. An increase in the discount rate
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4) The model also provides a straightforward explanation for
the observed pattern of large adjustments in quantities and small
ones in prices following monetary policy interventions. This is due
to fact that, owing to the credit transmission mechanism, both
aggregate demand and supply are affected in the same direction. As
can be seen in the lower panel of 0, after an increase in Kt, the
output market in period t+1 will receive less supply and less
demand, the latter being due to the lesser amount of credit-deposits
created in period t. Consequently, the fall of Pt+1 relative to Pt will be
small, or seemingly "sticky", in relation to the observed change in
output (see Stiglitz, 1992).
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To conclude: the thrust of our analysis is that the credit
transmission mechanism can have supply-side effects as it activates
compound movements in the bank interest rate, the wage rate and
inflation that may not compensate each other. This result is implicit
in Greenwald-Stiglitz (1988a, 1993a) and Delli Gatti-Gallegati (1997)
The latter paper, which, unlike those by Greenwald and Stiglitz
embodies a complete AD-AS model similar to the one presented
here, also concludes that in RE-equilibrium aggregate supply
depends on the interest rate35. In these papers, however, labour
market relations are postulated without explicit demand-supply
analysis, and they therefore are unable to specify the labour market
conditions under which the result holds.
It may be of some interest to note that the transmission
mechanism outlined above has connections with the old credit view
and with pre-Keynesian monetary theories of business cycles (see
e.g. Trautwein, 2000; Blanchard, 2000). Absent the "real anchor"
given by the marginal product of capital, there exists a continuum
of general equilibria each characterized by a output-inflation couple
(Q(t)t+1, pt+1) for any given couple (Kt, ft). Once one equilibrium has
been chosen, say by a given inflation target, autonomous changes in
credit supply - as represented by the impulse variable ft - generate
spells of real expansion-inflation (or real recession-deflation)
characterized by downturns (upturns) in the bank interest rate
relative to expected inflation. These may be called BLC credit cycles
to distinguish them from the NWC credit cycles studied, for
example, by Kyiotaki and Moore (1997).36 The policy message has
instead a Keynesian outlook in that a deflationary monetary policy,
which typically makes bank real interest rates increase, has zero
real costs only to the extent that real wages fall as much as real
                                        
35Delli Gatti and Gallegati also analyze a regime with fully exogenous
money supply. They also include the value of internal funds in the
aggregate supply function and show that a further NWC of short-run
neutrality operates as long as firms' expected price differs from the the
actual price in t+1.
36Of course, our model does not yield an endogenous credit cycle as NWC
models do.
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interest rates rise. Our model presents an economy where this
condition is not fulfilled owing to workers’ preferences in an
unfettered labour market. Labour market imperfections may throw
other spanners into the works37.
4.4. Identification of the credit channel and emprical results
Empirical analyses of the relevance of supply-side effects of
the BLC are much less developed than those concerned with
traditional demand-side effects. Very indirect indications that
supply-side effects may exist can be obtained with the so-called
"cross sectional" approach examined in section 3, that is to say,
empirical investigations of the impact of changes in credit
conditions on firms' asset and liability management (inclusive of
inventories) conducted at disaggregate level. Since, as seen in
section 3, these works generally find that bank-dependent firms,
especially medium and small ones, normally resort to credit to buy
working capital, and that they are unable to fully cushion credit
crunches by means of alternative funds, it may be concluded that in
these firms supply decisions tend to react to changes in credit
conditions, starting from inventories up to production activity.
In Fiorentini and Tamborini (2000), we  performed a direct
estimation of a general equilibrium model similar to the one
presented here with quarterly Italian data from 1987:4 to 1998:12.
Starting from a fully specificied general equilibrium model of the
economy, and with the goal of testing the permanent BLC effects
indicated by the model, we  chose to perform a traditional
estimation of the system of equations of the model's rational-
expectations equilibrium. Assuming a Cobb-Douglas production
function for firms, and a conventional semi-linear utility function
for workers, we obtained a log-linearized form of the model which
implies QN < 1, Np < Nw.  We  chose as dependent variables the
wage index deflated by the production price index, the average bank
                                        
37Developments of policy implications can be found in Delli Gatti-Gallegati
(1997) and Tamborini (1997).
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lending rate, the gross domestic product at constant prices
(seasonally adjusted), and the rate of change in the production price
index; as explanatory variables the overnight rate as an indicator of
the monetary policy stance38, and a proxy for exogenous credit
supply shifts39. The time lag t, t+1 was calibrated to 4 quarters.
Let us first address the "causation puzzle" in relation to the
correct identification of the credit channel of monetary policy
discussed in section 3. In alternative to the identification strategy
based on disaggregate analysis, we  proposed a technique that is
suited to aggregate models since it exploits a full general-
equilibrium system of demand-supply equations like (4.17). In brief,
                                        
38We  relied on existing evidence and practice in Italian studies pointing to
the overnight rate as a good measure of the monetary policy stance in Italy
(De Arcangelis-Di Giorgio, 1998, Buttiglione-Ferri, 1994).
39We would point out to readers interested in this approach a particularly
delicate aspect that concerns the measurement of autonomous credit
supply shifts, i.e. the variable ft. We think that inclusion of this variable is
important in order to obtain a good identification of the BLC. Yet two major
difficulties should be overcome. The first is that in theory and practice part
of the credit supply policy of banks may be endogenous, i.e. correlated
with some of the dependent variables. The problem is analogous to the one
addressed in the empirical models of monetary policy discussed in section
3.  This possibility is in fact present in the model presented here, where f º
F(u*t). Inspection of equation (4.4) shows that, for all firms, u*t º
WtNtRt/Pt+1Q(t)jt+1; given that the profit-maximizing condition is QN =
WtRt/Pt+1, it results that u* = QNNt/Q(t)t+1, i.e. the value of output
elasticity. The Cobb-Douglas production function thus ensures that u* is
exogenous and constant, and that changes in ft are to be ascribed to
exogenous modifications in the generating function F. However, production
functions with non-constant output elasticity may imply that credit risk is
either pro-cyclical or counter-cyclical. The second difficulty concerns
measurement of credit risk, or at least of true innovations in credit supply.
Following the methodology adopted by Christiano et al. (1996) to solve the
same problem in the case of monetary policy variables, we  used as a proxy
for ft the residuals of an independent regression of total credit on the
policy variable, a measure of the cycle and time trend, after controlling for
exogeneity and orthogonality.
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the null hypothesis was that the credit channel operates vis-à-vis
the alternative hypothesis that it does not. The identifying signal
given by system (4.17) is the sign of the comovements between Rt
and Q(t)t+1 consequent on each of the exogenous shocks. If H0
holds, after a policy shock Rt should rise as Q(t)t+1 falls. If Kt
instead affects aggregate demand and hence credit demand but not
credit supply - that is, H1 holds - Rt should not rise (and might
possibly fall) as a consequence of a reduced credit demand and a
constant credit supply.  An analogous exercise can be performed
with the wage equation. Again, under H0, Kt has a negative effect on
wt. Under H1,  Kt can only have real effects as long as wt fails to
adjust. This identification scheme of the credit channel is
summarized in table 1. As can be seen, the various cases do not
overlap, so that identification can be reliable.
Table 1. Identification scheme
dKt
H0
dwt -
dRt +
dQ(t)t+1 -
H1
dwt 0
dRt -,0
dQ(t)t+1 -,0
After standard tests for unit roots, cointegration and correct
identification of exogenous variables, we  estimated the model by
means of Phillips' Fully Modified Ordinary Least Squares technique.
We  found evidence in the Italian economy that credit conditions,
and monetary policy to the extent that it induces banks to alter
credit conditions, affect the supply-side of the economy according to
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the transmission mechanism described in this section. The
estimated steady-state elasticities of output and the bank lending
rate relative to the policy instrument are significantly centered on
the values 0.4 and -0.27, respectively, at a 5% confidence level.
Inflation is weakly, though correctly (i.e. negatively), related to the
policy instrument. These estimates are also consistent with the BLC
identification scheme in table 1. Estimation of the wage rate
coefficient yields a correctly signed but non-significant value: this
may support the stickiness hypothesis, which however may only
amplify the real effects of the BLC.  With respect to the results
favourable to the BLC discussed in section 3, our estimations of
output responsiveness to the policy instrument are in line with
those of Buttiglione-Ferri (1994) and Bagliano-Favero (1995).
However, if the supply-side analysis of the transmission mechanism
is correct, the relevant results should be understood as steady-
state, permanent relationships rather than transitory dynamics led
by aggregate demand and sticky prices.
5. Conclusions
Money supply and monetary policy work through the
economy in several different ways. The foregoing investigation into
the macroeconomics of the credit view has confirmed that the
"special role of credit" when capital markets are imperfect or less
developed like in Italy contributes significantly to the connection
between money and economic activity, and indeed deserves closer
attention from macroeconomists. On the other hand, the credit
channel of monetary transmission is not easily detectable,  nor is it
easily predictable and controllable for policy purposes, at very
aggregate levels of analysis. Specific firm-bank structures and
relationships, as well as local institutional features, determine the
credit-channel's transmission of monetary impulses - whether these
impulses are amplified or dampened - in a way that requires
detailed microeconomic analysis.
45
Further considerations to be drawn from our analysis can be
summarized as follows. Firstly, the shift in theoretical focus implied
by the credit view is important, yet whether the credit transmission
mechanism has stronger effects than the money  transmission
mechanism remains largely an empirical matter. Secondly, there are
both theoretical and empirical clues pointing to credit conditions as
an important vehicle for real supply-side effects of monetary policy
that has hitherto been disregarded. Pursuing this view opens some
interesting lines of research . On theoretical grounds, the time
structure of transactions,  contractual arrangements in the labour
and credit markets, and the formation and effect of price
expectations are all critical elements in modelling a credit economy
that call for more careful anlysis. With regard to empirical analysis,
it is also important to discriminate the source and nature of the
shocks driving the adjustment of real and nominal variables in the
economy: credit, real or inflationary shocks trigger different patterns
of adjustment, though they all involve the credit transmission
mechanism. Discriminating among them is  necessary  in order to
correctly identify the existence and extent of the credit channel in
the monetary transmission mechanism.
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Appendix
In this Appendix we provide the derivation of households'
labour supply and output demand functions and of banks' credit
supply function used in the model set out in section 4.
A.1. Households
Households perform three activities: labour supply, output
demand and saving. With respect to the financial structure adopted
in section 3, it will be convenient to limit the scope of assets to
money, which is held in bank deposits at zero interest rate40.
According to the time structure of the economy, at the beginning of
each production period t each household h owns the previous
period's deposits Dt-1, can sell labour Nsht at the market wage rate
Wt, earn WtNsht and save Dht for consumption in t+1 C(t)ht+1, on the
expectation of price Pet+1. Consumption for t C(t)ht can be bought
out of t-1 production Q(t-1)t by spending Dt-1 deposits at the price
Pt, before the new production round starts, whereas consumption
for t+1 C(t)ht+1 will be satisfied by Q(t)t+1, and so on. Therefore, the
general representation of the household's problem as of t is a
sequence of choices {Ch: C(t)ht+1, C(t+1)ht+2, ...},   {Nsh: Nsht, Nsht+1,
...} such that, for each production period t41,
(A1) maxC,N Uht = U(Ch, Nsh)
       +    -
s.t.
PtC(t)ht < Dt-1
Pet+1C(t)ht+1 < Dt
Dt = Dt-1  - C(t)ht + WtNht
                                        
40This is of course a strong limitation, but it does not alter the substance
of the results. Moreover, this assumption is the couterpart of firms' equity
rationing in the fashion that has been explained in paragraph 4.1.
41See Sargent (1986) for a dicussion of general solutions.
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Using Pt as numeraire, the solution to the foregoing problem
includes a labour supply function of the generic form
(A2) Nsht = Ns(wt, pet+1)
                +       -
This function reflects the household's choice between
working time and consumption in t, and between consumption in t
and t+1. In this model, the value of Wt relative to Pt measures the
incentive to work in period t in view of consumption in t+1, given
the amount of consumption obtained for period t. In fact, for any
given value of Dt-1, Pt acts as wealth effects, determining the
amount of consumption goods C(t)ht with which the household
enters the production period. Cet. par., high C(t)ht, i.e. low Pt relative
to Wt, requires a parallel increase in C(t)ht+1 to restore the
intertemporal marginal rate of substitution along the optimal
consumption path, and therefore the household should also
increase labour supply. At the same time, the cross-elasticity
between present working time and future consumption is not nil:
higher pet+1, i.e. higher Pet+1 relative to Pt, shifts resources from
future to current consumption of goods (i.e. output and leisure) so
that the labour supply is decreasing in pet+1 42.
Looking at the constraints of the household's problem we can
also deduce a generic function for consumption, which at the end of
each period can be equal to or less than the real value of deposits:
(A3) C(t)ht+1 = C(Dt) /Pt+1 
C(Dt) < Dt
The possibility that C(Dt) < Dt arises because at the end of each
period households cannot spend more than previous period's
deposits, but may choose to spend less and carry more resources to
                                        
42The fact that households, too, decide under price uncertainty (the actual
price Pjt+1 that any household may pay differs from the expected price
Pe(t)t+1 with positive probability) may result in their decisions depending
on the specific form of the utility function, but does not modify the model's
main properties substantially.
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the next period depending on their intertemporal preferences. In
any case, the result is a simple demand function determined by
money balances.
A.2. Banks and central bank
Banks collect deposits from households at zero rate, and offer
standard debt contracts in a competitive market. Since firms are ex-
ante homogenous, banks face no screening problems. However they
bear monitoring costs whenever a firm defaults on payments. Credit
recovery in case of bankruptcy for any firm j is Pjt+1Q(t)jt+1. Since
the incentive to monitor firms exists up to equality between credit
recovery and  monitoring cost,  without loss of generality we can set
the net revenue from defaulting firms to zero43. As to the cost of
funds, in the absence of the interest rate on deposits, we introduce
a kind of cost which is important in bank's risk management and
gives an explicit role to play to the central bank as lender of last
resort.
In consideration of the time structure of the economy, banks’
balance sheets evolve intertemporally over production periods. At
the beginning of each t, a bank b can grant loans Lsbt. Loans
finance the wage bill for period t and are therefore redeposited by
households as savings for period t+1 (see paragraph A.1).
(A4) Lsbt = Dt
The bank expects a gross return from loans (capital and interests)
Zebt and, in view of the fact that households will claim on Dt, it is
committed to fufilling the following liquidity constraint in t+1
(A5) Zebt+1 > Lsbt
As explained in paragraph 4.1, each loan at time t to a firm
embodies a default risk fjt. After inspection of the definition of fjt,
and of the solution of the production programme of each firm, it
results that fjt = ft for all j. Recalling that the bank expects zero net
revenue at time t+1 from a defaulting firm,  the bank anticipates a
liquidity risk (the probability of gross returns falling short of
                                        
43See Fiorentini-Tamborini (2000) for detailed analysis.
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deposits) for each loan with probability fjt., The bank can insure
itself against this risk by borrowing from the central bank at the
gross rate Kt , i.e. it can cover all default states Lsbtft under the
obligation to repay the premium LsbtftKt in t+1. Therefore, under
the constraint (A5), the bank's objective function is
(A6) LsbtRbt(1 - ft) - LsbtKtft - Lsbt > 0
Competitive pressure will drive this expression to equality, and the
bank interest rate to the unique market value
(A7) Rt = (1 - ft)-1 + ft(1 - ft)-1Kt
The result is that the bank interest rate is determined as a
credit risk premium above the central bank rate. At the rate Rt all
credit demand is satisfied, while the amount BRt = Lsbtft of
borrowed reserves is created. To maintain the connection with the
model in section 3, we may say that borrowed reserves also show up
in the central bank's balance sheet as monetary base Ht. As is
obvious, since in this model the central bank pegs the interest rate,
the creation of monetary base is endogenous, being equal to the
risk-adjusted fraction of bank loans.
